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Abstract—The first aim of this article is to provide readers
informally with the basic notions of defeasible and non-monotonic
reasoning, logics borrowed from artificial intelligence. It then
describes argumentation theory, a paradigm for implementing
defeasible reasoning in practice as well as the common multi-
layer schema upon which argument-based models are usually
built. The second aim is to describe the selection of argument-
based applications in the medical and health-care sectors. Finally,
the paper will conclude with a summary of the features, which
make defeasible reasoning and argumentation theory attractive,
that emerge from the applications under review. The target
reader is a medical or health-care practitioner, with limited
skills in formal knowledge representation and logic, interested
in enhancing evidence modelling and aggregation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The capability of deriving defeasible conclusions with
partial information is an important aspect of modern medi-
cal systems. In order to achieve such a capability, humans
routinely resort to the so-called default knowledge, a main
feature of which is that it can be used in a reasoning process
even if the preconditions for its application are only partially
known. These preconditions, whose truth is not explicitly
verified, are assumed to hold defeasibly, that means in the
absence of explicit information to the contrary. In the event
that new information becomes available and the falsity of such
preconditions can be deduced, then the conclusions derived
from the application of the default knowledge have to be
retracted. This type of reasoning is known as defeasible rea-
soning [2]. Default knowledge is represented by using defaults
that are specific inference rules. These are expressions of the
form: p(x) : j1(x), ..., jn(x) −→ c(x) where p(x) is the
prerequisite of the default, j(x) is the justification and c(x)
is the consequent. If p(x) is known and if j(x) is consistent
with what is known, then c(x) can be defeasibly deduced.
In other words, if it is believed that the prerequisite is true,
and each of the n conditions (justifications) can be assumed
since they are consistent with current beliefs, then this leads
to believe the truth of the conclusion.
Defeasible reasoning, unlike standard deductive reasoning,
is non-monotonic. Intuitively this means that adding new
premises may lead to removing, rather than adding new
conclusions. More specifically, if the conclusion p follows
from a set of premises A (denoted as A  p), in standard
monotonic reasoning it also holds that A,B  p namely t, if
and only if any additional set of premises B is added to A, the
conclusion p is still valid. This property is called monotonicity:
conclusions are not affected by new evidence hence the set of
conclusions monotonically increases. This is not the case in
real life, and more particularly, in non-monotonic reasoning
where conclusions can be retracted when new evidence is avail-
able. Consider the following example: X has undergone breast
cancer surgery and subsequently radiotherapy. Radiotherapy
minimises the risk of cancer recurrence, so it is possible to
derive that X has a low risk of breast cancer recurrence. If
in addition to the fact that X has undergone cancer surgery
and subsequently radiotherapy, it is found out that X had a
cancer with high degree of lymph node involvement, then the
conclusion that X has a low risk of cancer recurrence has
to be retracted, as a special exception has been raised. Non-
monotonic logic relies on the idea that the pieces of knowledge
employed in a reasoning activity such as X has a low risk of
cancer recurrence may admit exceptions and it is impossible to
include a full list of exceptions within the reasoning rules [2].
In these cases, the premise of a certain rule is only partially
specified and a conclusion can be derived from the premises,
assuming that no exception occurs, that means that all the
implicit premises of the rule are satisfied. In the case where an
exception subsequently arises then the derived conclusion has
to be retracted. The basic idea of non-monotonic inferences
is that, when more information is obtained, some previously
accepted inference may no longer hold. Defeasible reasoning
has increasingly gained attention in the medical sector because
it supports reasoning over partial, incomplete and dynamic
evidence and knowledge, where several exceptions can arise
according to various circumstances. Argumentation theory
(AT), an important sub-field of artificial intelligence (AI),
provides state-of-the-art computational models of defeasible
reasoning (DR).
This paper is structured as follows. Firstly, AT is introduced
with an emphasis on its role in defeasible reasoning. This is
followed by a detailed description of the multi-layered pattern
upon which argument-based systems are usually structured
follows. A brief overview of some practical applications of
AT in clinical domains is then presented followed by a dis-
cussion highlighting the main advantages of DR and AT in
decision-making and knowledge representation. A conclusion
summarises the paper.
II. ARGUMENTATION THEORY
Argumentation theory (AT) is a multi-disciplinary research
subject ranging from law to philosophy and linguistic, with
aspects borrowed from psychology and sociology. AT has
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gained interest in artificial intelligence as it provides the basis
for computational models inspired by the way humans reason.
These models have extended classical reasoning approaches,
based on deductive logic, that were proving increasingly
inadequate for problems requiring non-monotonic reasoning
and explanatory reasoning not available in standard non-
monotonic logics [8]. AT focuses on how pieces of evidence,
seen as arguments, can be represented, supported or discarded
in a defeasible reasoning process, and it investigates formal
models to assess the validity of the conclusions achieved [34].
AT differs from many traditional monolithic non-monotonic
logics because it envisages a modular and intuitive process,
supporting the explanation of each reasoning step, making the
reasoning and inference processes more explanatory. Thanks
to the above features AT has been employed for tasks like
practical reasoning, decision support, dialogue and negotiation
[3], [31], [34].
In a nutshell, argumentation deals with the interactions
between possibly conflicting arguments, arising when different
parties argue for and against some conclusions or when
different pieces of evidence are available [23]. Arguments
can be regarded as ‘tentative proofs for propositions’ [19]
in a logical language whose axioms represent premises in
the domain under consideration. In general, the premises
are not consistent because they may lead to incompatible
conclusions. As already mentioned, these conflicts may
arise either during the defeasible reasoning activity of a
single agent or in the context of a multi-agent dialogue.
These modes are referred to as monological and dialogical
argumentation, respectively. Accordingly, monological models
[4] focus on the internal structure of an argument, meaning
its components (like premises, rules, conclusions) and their
relations. Dialogical models focus instead on argument
conflicts and their solutions and typically regard arguments as
monolithic entities, whose internal structure is abstracted away
as far as the conflict resolution process is concerned. Roughly
speaking, monological models concern the production and
construction of arguments while dialogical models concern
management of their conflicts, that means the actual arguing
process. A third classification of models, referred to as
rhetorical, has also been proposed in which neither the
monological nor the dialogical structure is considered [4].
Here, the rhetorical nature of arguments is stressed. More
specifically, the audience’s perception of arguments and how
they can be employed as a means of persuasion is considered
[16] [25]. Argument-based systems are generally built upon
five layers [30], as it follows.
Layer 1: definition of the internal structure of arguments
The internal representation of arguments is addressed by
monological models. Often an argument is internally repre-
sented with a set of premises, and a conclusion follows from
them with the application of some rule. Many argumenta-
tion systems do not make any distinction between premises.
However, arguments actually used in human reasoning may
follow a more articulated structure where different premises
play different roles, as in the argument model first introduced
by Toulmin [35] composed of six parts (fig. 1).
• Claim (C): an assertion or a claim (conclusion) that has a
potentially controversial nature;
• Data (D): statements specifying facts/beliefs previously
established related to a situation in which the claim is made;
• Warrant (W): statement that justifies the derivation of the
conclusion from the data;
• Backing (B): a set of information that ensures the trustwor-
thiness of a warrant. It is the grounds underlying the reason.
A backing is invoked when the warrant is challenged;
• Qualifier (Q): a statement that expresses the degree of
certainty associated with the claim;
• Rebuttal (R): a statement introducing a situation in which
the conclusion might be defeated.
Fact (D) So (probably) (Q) Conclusion (C)
Warrant (W)
since
Backing (B)because Rebuttal (R)unless
Fig. 1: An illustration of Toulmin’s argument representation
Toulmin’s model plays a significant role in highlighting the
elements that might form a natural argument, and provides a
useful basis for knowledge representation. Another well-
known monological paradigm has been proposed by Reed and
Walton to model the notion of arguments as product [37], [32].
It is based upon the notion of an argumentation scheme and it
is useful for identifying and evaluating a variety of argumenta-
tion structures in everyday discourse [4]. These argumentation
schemes are aimed at capturing common stereotypical patterns
of reasoning that are non-monotonic and defeasible in nature.
Let us suppose that B and H are discussing chemotherapy, and
that H is not in favour of it because H thinks that it has a high
emotional impact on the person due to the risk of alopecia
phenomenon and should be discouraged. H’s argument is: Dr.
P (expert in psychology) says that chemotherapy affects the
emotional state. It appears that H’s argument is implicitly
an appeal to expert opinion. In addition, it is evidently an
instance of argument from consequences. These two schemes
can be used by H to build her point of view. H is claiming that
negatively affecting the emotional state is a bad consequence
of an action. The argument is based upon the assumption that,
since the bad outcome is a consequence of chemotherapy,
therefore chemotherapy should not be applied. This can be
represented by the following argumentation chain:
• Dr. P., an expert psychologist, says that chemotherapy
negatively affects emotional state, because he has knowledge
of patients emotions
• chemotherapy negatively affects emotional state
• negatively affecting the emotional state is a bad thing
• anything that leads to bad consequences is a bad practice
• chemotherapy is a bad practice.
Walton identified 25 different argumentation schemes, each
including a set of critical questions such as ‘is the expert E in a
position to know about the proposition A?’. Critical questions
provide a sort of checklist about the validity conditions for the
application of a specific argument scheme. Intuitively, critical
questions make the defeasibility of argument schemes explicit
and indicate some canonical ways to build the relevant coun-
terarguments. Toulmin’s model as well as Reed and Walton’s
approach do not specify the way different argument structures
can be aggregated nor how they can interact or conflict in
the dynamics of an argumentation process. Their main aim is
modelling internal argument structure, specifying the criterion
of acceptance for argument. The reader can refer to [4] for a
description of other monological models of arguments.
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Layer 2: definition of the conflicts between arguments
Monological models, aimed at representing the internal
structure of arguments are complemented by dialogical models,
focused on the relationships between arguments and, in partic-
ular, their conflicts. The latter investigates the issue of invalid
arguments that appear to be valid (fallacious arguments). Con-
flicts (also called attacks or defeats, sometimes with slightly
different meanings) are key notions in AT. In the AT literature
several kinds of conflicts have been considered. We recall the
classification proposed in [29] encompassing the three classes
of undermining, rebutting and undercutting attacks.
• undermining attack: an argument can be attacked on one of
its premises by another whose conclusion negates that premise.
Example: ‘alcohol consumption is low according to X so X has
a low risk of recurrence’ can be undermined by the alcohol
level emerging from a blood test is high so X has a high
consumption of alcohol
• rebutting attack occurs when an argument negates the conclu-
sions of another argument. Example: ‘ radiotherapy minimises
this risk’ so X has a low risk of breast cancer recurrence can
be rebutted by ‘X is an old patient, the strongest risk for breast
cancer is age, so the risk of recurrence is high’.
• undercutting attack occurs when an argument uses a de-
feasible inference rule and is attacked by arguing that there
is a special case that does not allow the application of the
rule itself [27]. Example: ‘radiotherapy minimises the risk of
recurrence so X has a low risk of breast cancer recurrence’
can be undercut by ‘paper Z demonstrated that radiotherapy
failed several times in curing breast cancer so it is not always
an effective method to reduce recurrence’.
Layer 3: evaluation of conflicts and definition of valid attacks
Conflict between arguments, although an important notion,
does not embody any approach for evaluating an attack. The
determination of the success of an attack, from one argument
to its target, is another important aspect of argument-based
systems. Generally an attack, sometimes referred to as ‘defeat’,
has a form of a binary relation between two arguments. Some
authors distinguish a relation in a weak form (attacking another
argument and not weaker) or in a strong form (attacking
another argument and stronger). The former is generally re-
ferred to as ‘defeat’ whereas the latter as ‘strict defeat’ [29].
Defeat relations are determined in various ways, depending
on the argumentation system. Often, they are influenced by the
domain of application and are usually defeasible. For instance,
in those domains where observations are important, defeat
relations might depend on the reliability of tests as well as
on observers having different expertise. To establish whether
an attack can be considered a successful defeat, a trend in AT
is devoted to the consideration of the strength of arguments.
In this respect a key concept is represented by the inequality
of the strength of arguments that has to be accounted for in
the computation of sets of arguments and counterarguments
[9]. Several works have adopted the notion of preferentiality
among arguments [24]. The information necessary to decide
whether an attack between two arguments is successful is
often assumed to be pre-specified, and implemented as an
ordering of values or a given partial preference. However,
according to [24], the information related to preferentiality of
arguments might be contradictory, as the preferences may vary
depending on the context and on different subjects who can
assign different strengths, to different arguments, employing
different criteria. This led the author to propose the concept of
meta-level argument: a simple node in a graph of nodes where
preferentiality is abstractly defined, by creating a new attack
relation that comes from a preference argument. Meta-level
arguments allow no commitment regarding the definition of
the preferences of arguments, rendering the reasoning process
simpler. As opposed to the preferentiality approach, another
branch of artificial intelligence is devoted to associate weights
to attack relations instead of arguments [9], [22]. The classical
binary relation of attack has been extended in [18] by employ-
ing the notion of fuzzy relations borrowed from Fuzzy Logic.
This approach allows the representation of the degree to which
an argument attacks another one. Similarly in [7] probabilities
are assigned to arguments and defeat relations referring to the
likelihood of their existence and thus capturing the inherent
uncertainties in the argumentation system. In summary, the
individuation of the proper valid attacks can be implemented
through the notion of strength of argument, preferentiality or
strength of attack relations.
Layer 4: definition of the dialectical status of arguments
Defeat relations, as defined in layer 3, focus on the relative
strength of two individual conflicting arguments and do not
tell yet what arguments can be seen as justifiable. The final
state of each argument depends on the interaction with the
others and a definition of their dialectical status is needed. This
layer is aimed at determining the outcome of an argumentation
system usually by splitting the set of arguments in two classes,
those that support a certain decision/action and those that do
not. Sometimes a further class can contain those arguments
that leave the dispute in an undecided status. Multiple ac-
tions/decisions can be accounted for in a defeasible reasoning
process, thus the number of classes can increase. Modern
implementations for computing the dialectical status of argu-
ments are built upon the theory of Dung [8] which, historically
speaking, derives from other more practical and concrete works
on argumentation [36] and [27]. Dung’s abstract argumentation
frameworks (AF) allow comparisons of different systems by
translating them into his abstract format [36]. The underlying
idea is that given a set of abstract arguments (the internal
structure is not considered) and a set of defeat relations,
a decision to determine which arguments can ultimately be
accepted has to be taken. AF is a directed graph in which
arguments are presented as nodes and the attacks as arrows
(figure 2). Solely looking at an argument’s defeaters to decide
the status of an argument is not enough: it is also important
to investigate whether the defeaters are defeated themselves.
Generally, an argument B defeats an argument A if and only
if B is a reason against A.
ABC
Fig. 2: Argument and reinstatement
Given an AF, the issue is to decide which arguments
should ultimately be accepted. In figure 2, A is attacked by
B, and apparently A should not be accepted since it has a
counterargument. However, B is itself attacked by C that, in
turn, is not attacked by anything, thus C should be accepted.
But if C is accepted, then B is ultimately rejected and does
not form a reason against A anymore. Therefore A should be
accepted as well. In this scenario it is said that C reinstates
A and in order to determine which arguments of an AF can
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be accepted, a formal criterion is necessary. This criterion is
known as acceptability semantics, and given an AF, it specifies
zero or more extensions (sets of acceptable arguments) [1].
Using a labelling approach by [39], each argument is either
in, out or undec according to the following two conditions:
1) an argument is labelled in if and only if all its defeaters are
labelled out, and 2) an argument is labelled out if and only if
it has at least one defeater labelled in. Informally speaking, an
argument labelled in means it has been accepted, out means it
has been rejected and undec means it can be neither accepted
nor rejected.
In the AF of figure 2, for argument C it holds that all
its defeaters are labelled out (trivial as C is not defeated by
any argument), thus C has to be labelled in. B now has a
defeater labelled in thus it has to be labelled out. For A, it
holds that all its defeaters are labelled out, so it has to be
labelled in. As a consequence the resulting status of each
argument is: Lab(A) =in, Lab(C) = in and Lab(B) = out.
Thus, A and C can be accepted and argument B has to be
rejected. A set of arguments is called conflict-free if and only
if it does not contain any argument A and B such that A
defeats B. A set of arguments Args is said to defend an
argument C if and only if each defeater of C is defeated by an
argument in Args. These basic notions drive the proposal of
the complete semantic aimed at computing complete extensions
[8]. The idea is that a complete labelling might be viewed
as a subjective and reasonable point of view that a designer
can consider with respect to which arguments are accepted,
rejected or considered undecided. Each point of view can be
certainly questioned by someone, but its internal inconsistency
cannot be pointed out. The set of complete labellings can be
seen as the reasonable positions available to a designer [39].
Complete semantics have an important property: more than
one complete extension might exist. However, sometimes it is
advantageous to take a skeptical approach, thus a semantic
that is guaranteed to generate exactly one extension is the
grounded semantic. The idea is to select the complete labelling
Lab in which the set of in-labelled arguments is minimal.
The grounded extension coincides with the complete labelling
in which in is minimised, out is minimised and undec is
maximised and can be the empty set. In figure 2, the grounded
extension is {A,C}. However, this skeptical approach might
be replaced by a more credulous one, known as preferred
semantic [8]. The idea is that, instead of maximising undec
arguments, it maximises in arguments (and also out argu-
ments). They are based on the notion of admissibility. A set
of arguments is admissible if and only if it is conflict-free and
defends at least itself. The empty set is admissible in every
AF as it is conflict-free and trivially defends itself against
each of its defeaters (none). For any AF, there exists at least
one preferred extension. Every grounded and every preferred
extension is a complete extension. In figure 2, the admissible
sets are {C}, {A,C}. {B} and {A} are not admissible as they
do not defend themselves respectively against C and B. Only
one preferred extension exists: {A,C}. Other semantics exist
and the reader is referred to [1].
Layer 5: accrual of acceptable arguments
Multiple acceptable extensions of arguments may be com-
puted from the previous layer coinciding with possible consis-
tent points of view that can be considered for describing the
knowledge being modelled and thus employed for decision-
making and support. However, sometimes for practical pur-
poses, as in the medical domain, a single decision/action must
be taken/performed. Thus a fifth layer is sometimes added to
the argumentative schema aimed at extracting the most credible
or consistent point of view for taking such a decision/action.
This layer includes a strategy for computing, for instance,
a credibility degree of each extension that can be used for
purposes of comparison. The most credible can be eventually
considered and employed to support decision-making.
In summary, the aforementioned five layers give an overall
idea of the main components that are usually considered in
an argumentative process, and are strictly connected. The first
layer deals with monological argumentation while the other
layers with dialogical argumentation. Some of these layers can
be missing or merged together. For example, when the strength
of arguments or attack relations is not considered, layer 3 can
be removed. Also, the strength of arguments may be considered
in the 5th layer and not only in the 3rd layer.
III. ARGUMENT-BASED APPLICATIONS IN THE MEDICAL
AND HEALTH CARE SECTOR
The literature of defeasible reasoning (DR) is vast in the
logic and artificial intelligence communities. Readers can refer
to [4] for a taxonomy of argument-based models and to [5] for
a review of DR implementations. In this section applications
of DR and argument-based systems in the medical and health-
care sectors are described.
DR was implemented in the context of the Aspic project
[12]: a general model for argumentation services. The goal
was to develop a theoretical framework for inference, decision-
making, dialogue and learning. This may be useful in health-
care, with potential applications in the identification of patients
treatment options. Examples included a multi-agent scenario
where three agents collaborate exchanging pros and cons of
alternative interventions and diagnoses towards settling on
a justifiable treatment for a patient with chest pain [10].
Argumentation has also been employed as a method for genetic
counselling: the goal was to provide an aid both for patients
and clinicians in customising, evaluating, visualising and com-
municating with respect to care plans. Eight cancer genetic
counsellors participated in a simulated experiment in which
they had to counsel a woman carrying a risk-increasing gene
mutation. Information was visually displayed in an organised-
fashion, in the form of structured arguments. These helped
counsellors in enhancing their discussion and explaining the
options available for mitigating the risk of cancer [13]. In
general, within the Aspic project, arguments are constructed
from a knowledge-base of facts, internally modelled with strict
and defeasible rules. Both are composed by a set of premises
supporting a claim. A tree of these rules can form an argument
and a numeric degree of belief is attached to each of them
(1 for strict arguments, a partial degree (< 1) for defeasible
arguments). Various principles to compute this value exist.
For example, these might be the ‘weakest link’ (being this
the minimum of the strength of its premises and its links)
or the ‘last link’ (the maximum strength of its links - no
accrual of reasons) [28]. Once arguments are defined, a set of
attack relations among them is explicated, always according
to the knowledge-base of facts. Dung’s calculus of opposition
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[8] is employed to compute a dialectical (justification) status
of arguments. Eventually, from the claim of the justified
arguments a final inference is drawn, being this usually a
decision, a diagnosis or a treatment recommendation.
DR has also been used in the context of medical group-
decision support. Here, usually expert clinicians participate
in a group discussion to decide on the best treatment for a
given patient or case. In [6], for example, a web-prototype
to build arguments was presented to a group of oncologists
who were supposed to discuss treatment therapy for patients
having cancer in the head-to-neck region. These were modelled
as natural language propositions related to a particular piece
of evidence, acquired from the literature, and linked to a
particular treatment choice. Each argument was accompanied
by a value indicating the strength of the evidence. A machinery
that extended Dung’s calculus of opposition [8] was proposed,
adding a preference-based accrual of arguments [6]. Further
research in the Aspic project, in the context of consensus on ex-
planations, focused on understanding how two clinicians, with
a disagreement in relation to an anomalous patients response to
treatment, exchanged arguments in order to arrive at a consen-
sus [15]. Argumentation theory (AT) has been employed for
predicting the recurrence of breast cancer in patients who have
undergone a surgery [21] [20]. Here, the knowledge-base of a
cancer expert has been translated into arguments with premises
supporting either recurrence or non-recurrence of cancer. This
monological structure has been subsequently extended adding
conflicts among arguments organised in a dialogical structure,
always according to the expert’s knowledge-base. In turn,
they were evaluated with Dung’s calculus of opposition using
preferred semantics. A strategy was implemented for selecting
the most credible preferred extension and thus proposing a
justifiable outcome (recurrence or non-recurrence) that was
also compared against the outcome of a few machine-learning
classifiers. In this context AT performed to the same level as
machine learning [20].
Gorogiannis et al. employed argumentation for investigat-
ing treatment efficacy and their work [14] was motivated by the
fact that, although there was a rapidly-growing dataset of trial
results, this dataset was inconsistent, incomplete and required
a lot of effort to be sensibly aggregated to enable a single
correct decision to be inferred. Therefore, authors proposed an
argument-based approach to analyse the available knowledge
and present the different possible results to the user. In their
frameworks, the monological structure of arguments is a triple
< A,B,C > with A the set of evidence from a clinical trail,
B an inference rule that links evidence to a claim C. A claim is
a comparison between the outcomes of two generic treatments
t1 and t2 (only two-arm comparisons are treated) that can be
either t1 > t2 (t1 is statistically superior to t2), t2 < t1 (vicev-
ersa) or t1 ∼ t2 (no statistical difference). Arguments (clinical
tests) might conflict if they entail contradicting claims, thus
authors employed the Dung’s calculus of opposition, starting
with clinical tests and reasons about acceptable and defeated
arguments. In [38] this framework is enhanced by allowing the
expression of preferences among arguments and by employing
descriptive logic to further specify their monological structure.
The authors performed a case study on ovarian cancer data
showing how the introduction of the dialogical Dung’s calculus
of opposition can help the selection of relevant/undisputed
clinical evidence in a large and fragmented dataset of cases.
[33] describes an application of argumentation to the
field of organ transplant called Carrel+. Human-organ is a
decision-making process that often illustrates conflicts among
medical experts: what may be sufficient for one doctor to
discard an organ may not be for another doctor. The framework
allows doctors to express their arguments about the viability
of an organ and employs argumentation techniques, namely
argumentation schemes and critical questions, to combine
arguments, to identify inconsistencies and to propose a valid
solution considering their relative strength and the available
evidence about the organ and the donor. The key difference
between [33], [26], [11] and the works [14], [38] is the
variability of the monological structure of arguments. In the
former works, arguments are hand-crafted and ad-hoc construct
built by relying on domain specific expertise and therefore
they have a variable monological structure. In the latter works
arguments are instead built directly from clinical trial results
with a uniform structure that makes the approach less domain-
dependent and scalable to large-volume data.
Ultimately, [17] is probably the most complete work ap-
plying argumentation to medical decision support. The work
is close to the 5-layer schema introduced in previous sec-
tions. First, the available evidence, collected from experts
or literature, is converted into a monological inductive ar-
gument structured as a inference rule; second the medical
expert sets preference relations by assigning weight to the
arguments (argument A can be preferred to B because, despite
having comparable effects, A has fewer side effects than
B). Third, meta-arguments can be built about the quality of
those created in the first stage (an argument based on a non-
randomised small sample is weaker than another based on
evidence collected on a large randomised sample). Forth, the
dialogical structure is arranged in a Dung style argumentation
graph and an argumentation semantic is used for computing
their dialectical and acceptability status from which consistent
conclusions can be suggested to the decision makers. The study
proposes several case studies: diagnosis of glaucoma, treatment
of hypertension and treatments of pre-eclampsia.
According to the previous overview, the main benefit pro-
vided by defeasible reasoning (DR) and argumentation theory
(AT) can be summarised as follows.
• inconsistency/incompleteness: DR provides a methodology
for reasoning on available evidence, even if this evidence is
partial and inconsistent as often happens in medicine;
• expertise/uncertainty: AT captures expertise in an organised
fashion, employing the notion of arguments, handling uncer-
tainty and the vagueness associated with clinical evidence;
• intuitiveness: AT is not based upon statistics or probability
and is thus close to the way humans reason. If a designer is
inclined to use statistical evidence anyway, this can be mod-
elled as an argument using a monological model. Additionally,
vague knowledge-bases can be structured as arguments built
with familiar linguistic terms, which is extremely appealing
for clinicians;
• explainability: AT leads to explanatory reasoning thanks
to its incremental, modular way of reasoning with evidence.
It provides semantics for computing arguments’ justification
status, allowing the final decision to be better explained;
• dataset independency: AT does not require a complete
dataset and it may be useful for emerging knowledge, where
quantitative evidence has not yet been gathered;
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• extensibility/updatability: DR is an extensible paradigm that
allows a decision to be retracted in the light of new evidence:
an argumentation system can be updated with new arguments;
• knowledge-bases comparability: AT allows comparisons of
different subjective knowledge-bases. Two clinicians might
build their own argumentation frameworks and identify dif-
ferences in the definition of their beliefs [21] and [20].
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has presented an overview of defeasible rea-
soning (DR) and argumentation theory (AT) with an informal
description of the common pattern usually adopted for im-
plementing such reasoning. An overview of current research
conducted in the medical and health-care sectors showed where
defeasible reasoning has been employed so far. The main
drawback concerns the anecdotal evidence that characterises
current instances of use. However, any attempt to design and
adopt defeasible and argument-based systems is encouraged
and supported as are comparisons with other canonical tech-
niques for decision-support, decision-making and knowledge-
representation. Finally, a summary of the appealing properties
of DR and AT was provided, to guide practitioners in the selec-
tion of argument-based applications in medical environments.
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